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概要
　現在ヨーロッパ諸国の国連平和維持活動に対する参加状況は、東西冷戦時代に彼らが一
貫して国連ミッションに貢献した「黄金期」と比較すると輝かしいものではない。ポスト
冷戦期においてヨーロッパ諸国は、国連ミッションよりは NATO（北大西洋条約機構）が
指揮を執るミッション、アフリカ諸国におけるヨーロッパ連合（EU）主導のミッション、
さらにはアフガニスタンの国際治安支援部隊（ISAF）のような非国連の大型ミッションに
多くの兵を送ることが多い。なぜならヨーロッパ諸国は、国連平和維持活動がミッション
をより効果的に実行するためのコンセンサスを得ることが困難であり、よって複雑なミッ
ションにおいてはそれを展開するうえでの十分な能力を国連は持ち合わせていないと認識
しているからである。現在ヨーロッパ諸国は、EU、NATO、あるいは国連主導のミッショ
ンに大別して 3種類の平和ミッションを選択することができる。
　またアフリカにおける平和ミッションに関しては、多くのアフリカ諸国が AU主導の
ミッションよりもむしろ国連ミッションにその兵を派遣する傾向にある。その結果アフリ
カに駐留する多くの国連ミッションは、地元のアフリカ諸国の兵によって構成されてい
る。ヨーロッパ諸国も近年フランスを除けば、アフリカ諸国そのものに対しての彼らの国
益の欠如によりアフリカの平和ミッションの参加に対しては消極的であった。
　それにもかかわらず本論は、ヨーロッパ諸国は次の 3つの理由で国連平和ミッションに
回帰すべきと提案する。まず第一の理由に現在の多くの EUミッションは、限定的であり、
規模や目的に関しても国連ミッションとは異なる。よってはヨーロッパ諸国は、EUと国
連のミッションを別個のものと考え、国連ミッションにもヨーロッパにとって需要がある
ために参加すべきというものである。2番目にヨーロッパ諸国には国連ミッションに参加
すべき「正当性」が存在するということである。3番目には、技術面などを代表するよう
な国連平和ミッションをヨーロッパ諸国が持ち合わせている「価値」の存在があげられる。
キーワード：ヨーロッパ諸国、国連平和維持活動、ヨーロッパ連合、正当性
ヨーロッパの国連平和維持活動への参加の歴史
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Abstract
　　It is difficult to mention that the European countries currently play a significant role in 
the UN peacekeeping operations, compared with their ‶golden ages" as the consistent peace-
keepers during the cold-war period. In the post-cold war period, the European countries are 
more willing to send their troops to NATO-commanded operations in Europe such as KFOR 
and IFOR, to small and short-term EU operations in Africa, and to large numbers of troops 
to ISAF in Afghanistan, than to UN peacekeeping. It is due to their recognition that UN 
peacekeeping has difficulty in building a consensus to make the mission effective, and 
therefore that it does not have sufficient capability to deal with complex missions. The Euro-
pean countries are currently given the choice of theirs ‶peacekeepers'" dispatching to EU-
led, NATO-led or UN-led peacekeeping operations, or none of the above. In terms of peace-
keeping operations in Africa, the African countries gave a shift of their troops' deployment 
from regional to UN peacekeeping. As a result, many UN peacekeeping operations in Africa 
largely consisted of African troops. Meanwhile, the involvement of European countries, ex-
cept France, in African conﬂicts has been insignificant due to a lack of their national interest. 
However, this paper advocates that the Europeans should go back to UN peacekeeping for 
three reasons. First, many EU peace operations, which are very limited and specified in their 
size and goals, are very different from UN operations. Therefore, European states should be 
encouraged to participate in UN peacekeeping when their professionalism is demanded. 
Second, European participation in UN peacekeeping should be recommended by the factor 
of legitimacy. Third, Europeans are demanded to participate in UN peacekeeping operations 
because of the values which Europeans have in conducting UN peacekeeping operations.
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1. Introduction
　　Currently, the performance of the European countries in the UN peacekeeping opera-
tions is not significant, compared with their ‶golden ages" as the consistent peacekeepers 
during the cold-war period. In the post-cold war period, the European countries are more 
willing to send their troops to NATO-commanded operations in Europe such as KFOR and 
IFOR, to many small and short-term EU operations in Africa, and to the massive troops to 
ISAF in Afghanistan, than to UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, ISAF might have been ‶a 
good excuse" for their passive participation in UN peacekeeping. However, the mission of 
ISAF terminated at the end of 2014. Therefore, the European countries was given their 
choice of their peacekeepers' dispatch to EU-led, NATO-led or UN peacekeeping opera-
tions, or none of the above. In reality, European troops are dispatched to the limited UN 
peacekeeping in the Middle East, namely, UNIFIL, and some other UN peacekeeping as a 
‶token" operation. The EU countries also dispatched their own small peacekeeping mis-
sion with limited mandate for short terms. Meanwhile, in terms of peacekeeping opera-
tions in Africa, the African countries gave a shift of their troops' deployment from regional 
to UN peacekeeping. As a result, many UN peacekeeping operations in Africa largely con-
sisted of African troops. The involvement of European countries, except France, in African 
conﬂicts has been passive. Since the majority of UN peacekeeping operations is located in 
Africa, Europeans' commitment to UN peacekeeping has been significantly diminished. 
How can the diminished commitment for their participation in UN peacekeeping be ex-
plained? Does it have legitimacy? Should they go back to UN peacekeeping? If so, why? 
　　This paper will focus on European participation in UN peacekeeping operations, and 
will answer the above questions. First, this paper will refer to the history of their strong 
enthusiasm about UN peacekeeping dispatch. Then, this paper will focus on the advent of 
regional and non-UN peacekeeping operations and how European states were involved in 
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them. The last part of this paper will argue over whether European states should be re-
committed to UN peacekeeping operations from various viewpoints. 
2. The History of the Contribution of European States to UN Peacekeeping Operations
　　During the cold-war period, many European states, especially West European states, 
were encouraged to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. Many western countries, 
except for two permanent members of UN Security Council, the UK and France, were the 
so-called ‶middle powers", and became enthusiastic contributors to UN peacekeeping op-
erations. When UN peacekeeping operations were established in 1948 and then gained in-
ternational legitimacy during the cold-war period, many Asian and African states were still 
not independent or their national troops were still too immature in their military skills and 
equipment to be sent to UN peacekeeping.
　　In fact, the European middle powers were considered to be the ideal UN peacekeep-
ers; on the one hand, in a peacekeeping role which mainly focuses on mediation and arbi-
tration, the coercive nature of the great powers would make host states apprehensive; and 
on the other hand, peacekeeping is a para-military role which requires appropriate military 
equipment, mission skills, discipline of soldiers, and high morale amongst troops. Europe-
an middle powers also provided logistical support capability, which is another important 
sector in peacekeeping missions. Therefore peacekeeping gave the middle powers a 
chance to have a leading role in international security issues, which restricted the super-
powers' role. This intention was shared with most of the European middle power contribu-
tions such as the Nordic States, Ireland, Portugal etc.
　　It is true that fear of starting World War III from the conﬂagration in the Middle East 
in 1956 and in 1973 encouraged European middle powers to be committed to peacekeep-
ing operations, UNEF I and UNEF II, respectively. As can be seen from Table 1, the Euro-
peans accounted for about 41 percent of the total contributing states in the major UN 
peacekeeping operations during the Cold-War period. Most of the European states in these 
figures are those of the middle European powers, with the exception for the cases of the 
UK in UNFYCIP and France in UNIFIL. Meanwhile, the contribution of the African states 
was very limited during this period. They accounted for 16 percent of the total contribut-
ing states in the major UN peacekeeping operations, and the majority of them were dis-
patched to the Congo in ONUC in the early 1960s to protect their own region. It was clear 
that Canada was the most consistent contributor, who indeed participated in all of the ma-
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jor UN peacekeeping operations. Australia was also an enthusiastic contributor as well as 
the European states. In short, not only European middle powers but also ‶the middle West-
ern states" should be categorized as ‶positive contributors to UN peacekeeping.
Table 1: Main UN Peacekeeping Operations and Contributing States during the Cold-War Period
Missions Durations Contributing States Euro%
UNEF I
(Sinai)
Nov. 1956
－ Jun. 1967
Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, 
Norway, Sweden, Yugoslavia
50%
ONUC
(Congo)
Jul. 1960
－ Jun. 1964
Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, 
Liberia, Malaya, Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherland, Nige-
ria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, 
Tunisia, UAR, Yugoslavia
27%
UNYOM
(Yemen)
Jul. 1963
－ Sep. 1964
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Ghana, India, Italy, Netherlands, 
Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia
55%
UNFICYP
(Cyprus)
Mar. 1964
－ Present
(When Established in 1964) Austria, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, 
Sweden, the UK
83%
UNIPOM
(India- Pakistan)
Sep. 1965
－Mar. 1966
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Den-
mark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden, Venezuela
42%
UNEF II
(Sinai)
Oct. 1973
－ Jul. 1979
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Ireland, 
Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Sweden 
38%
UNDOF
(Golan Heights)
Jun. 1974
－ Present
(When Established in 1974) Austria, Canada, Peru, Poland 50%
UNIFIL
(South Lebanon)
Mar. 1978
－ Present
(When Established in 1978) Canada, France, Iran, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Norway, Senegal
29%
Total 41%
Source:  United Nations The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, Third Edition (New York: The Unit-
ed Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), William J. Durch (ed.) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: 
Case Studies and Comparative Analysis (New York: St. Martin's, 1993)
　　The end of the Cold War, which terminated the indiscriminate use of the veto by the 
permanent members of the UN Security Council, led to a significant increase in the quanti-
ty of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, the number of UN peacekeeping opera-
tions deployed was increased from 11 in January 1988 to 28 by December 1994. So was 
the number of states contributing to UN peacekeeping.
　　According to the author's statistics from The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Na-
tions Peace-keeping, Third Edition (New York: The United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 1996), in total 112 states out of the whole 181 members of the UN participat-
ed in at least one UN peacekeeping operation. The total number of contributing states to 
UN operations between 1948 and 1996 was 905 states. Therefore, the average number of 
peacekeeping operations per contributing state was 8.1 operations. Table 2 is a list of 27 
states, which can be considered to be ‶the positive contributors" to UN peacekeeping op-
erations which contributed at least 15 UN operations from 1948 to 1996.
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Table 2:  The Top 27 contributing states to UN peacekeeping from 1948 to 1996, 
by the number of operations where the states dispatched their contingents
The Number of Operations Contributing States
33 Canada
26 Ireland, Sweden, Jordan
25 Norway
22 Argentina, Bangladesh
21 India, Pakistan
20 Austria, Netherland, Poland, Ghana, 
19 Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria
18 New Zealand, 
17 France, Egypt
16 Russia, Australia, Brazil
15 Belgium, Italy, Kenya
Source:  United Nations The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, Third 
Edition (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996)
　　According to Table 2, the top 27 major contributing states dispatched their national 
contingents to in total 542 operations. Among them, the European states contributed to 
256 operations, which accounted for 47 percent of the total operations. Meanwhile, the Af-
rican states contributed to in total 71 operations, which accounted for 13 percent of the to-
tal operations. In terms of the total number of military personnel of UN peacekeeping, at 
the end of 1996, the grand total number was 24,919. The number of European personnel 
was 9,379, which accounted for about 38% of the total UN personnel. (Table 3)
Table 3: The Top 50 Troop Contributing States to UN Peacekeeping Operations (December 1996)
Rank ContributingStates Strength Rank
Contributing
States Strength Rank
Contributing
States Strength
1 Pakistan 1,712 18 Ireland 745 35 Hungary 102
2 India 1,211 19 Norway 732 36 Netherlands 100
3 Bangladesh 1,184 20 Fiji 642 37 Kenya 95
4 Russia 1,173 21 Argentina 595 38 Bulgaria 79
5 Jordan 1,127 22 Slovak Rep. 588 39 Nigeria 78
6 Poland 1,097 23 Zambia 551 40 Italy 71
7 Canada 1,044 24 France 502 41 Senegal 66
8 Brazil 978 25 Ukraine 438 42 Mali 62
9 Finland 924 26 Portugal 406 43 Czech Rep. 49
10 Uruguay 912 27 UK 405 44 Spain 47
11 Zimbabwe 894 28 Namibia 206 45 Japan 45
12 Austria 867 29 Indonesia 205 46 Korea Rep. 40
13 Belgium 836 30 Germany 173 47 Turkey 40
14 Romania 787 31 Sweden 168 48 China 38
15 Nepal 767 32 Denmark 125 49 Australia 32
16 Ghana 766 33 Malaysia 122 50 Tunisia 32
17 USA 759 34 Egypt 102
Source:  The Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations, as of 31 December 1996, Department 
of UN Peacekeeping Operations, NY
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　　On the whole, the European states contribute to UN peacekeeping operations not only 
during the cold war period after its establishment in 1948, but also in the early post-cold 
war period, when the European states consistently met the increasing demand of UN oper-
ations. It is to be noted that the European states contributed about 40 percent of the total 
contributing states as well as the total strength. This figure was significant even if one ac-
cepted the relative superiority of economic and military strength which the European 
states had in the international community. In other words, the European states positively 
accepted the philosophy of the UN as multi-lateralism and put themselves in the frame-
work in UN security system by participating in peacekeeping operations.
3.  Peacekeeping and Peace-making by Regional Organizations and its Impact on Europe-
an States’ Commitment to UN Peacekeeping Operations
　　In the post-cold war period, the international community became more insecure, the 
framework of conﬂict resolutions became more diverse and complex, and this tendency 
became more significant after the so-called ‶9.11" terrorist attack. This tendency brought 
about the proliferation of operations mandated and conducted by regional organizations 
such as AU, EU and NATO and coalitions of the willing. 
　　In fact, the UN showed a positive stance towards its cooperative action with regional 
organizations. The Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threat, Chal-
lenges and Change, ‶A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" in 2004, accepted 
that there has been a trend towards a variety of regional- and sub-regional-based peace-
keeping missions. On the one hand, Secretary-General Kofi Annan claimed that this trend 
held the promise of developing regional capacity to address shortfalls in the numbers of 
peacekeepers. On the other hand, he also considered that this posed a challenge for the Se-
curity Council and regional organizations to work closely with each other and mutual sup-
port of each other's effort to keep the peace and ensure that regional operations are ac-
countable to universally accepted human rights standard.1 In 2005, Annan reaffirmed the 
importance of complementary roles which the UN and regional organizations should play 
in facing the challenges to international peace and security. He also desired to introduce 
memoranda of understanding between the UN and regional organizations, governing the 
sharing of information, expertise and resources.2
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Table 4:  Examples of Non-UN Peace Operations conducted by the European states, autho-
rized by the UN Security Council, 1994-2009
types of missions examples
“spear-head”
operations
NATO-led IFOR in Bosnia (1995): helping implement the Dayton Accord the 
French Operation Licorne in Cote d’ Ivoire (2002-03): prior to ECOFORCE and 
MINUCI
stabilization
operations
NATO-led SFOR in Bosnia (1996)
NATO-led KFOR in Kosovo (1999-present): supporting UNMIK
NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan (2003-2014): supporting UNAMA
“fire-fighting”
operations
NATO's Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia (1995): supporting UNPROFOR
the French-led Operation Turqoise in Rwanda (1994): supporting UNAMIR
the UK-led Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone (2000): supporting UNAMSIL
the French-led Operation Artemis in the DRC (2003):supporting MONUC
“over-the-horizon”
operations
EUFOR RD in the DRC (2006): supporting elections
Source:  Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, ‶The West and Contemporary Peace Operations", Journal 
of Peace Research, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2009, pp. 39-57
　　Table 4 gives the examples of non-UN peace operations conducted by the European 
states and authorized by the UN Security Council. They were in the framework of the EU 
and NATO and deployed by only a single great European power, the UK and France in 
1994-2009. The EU's commitment to regional peacekeeping operations has been based on 
its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which was created at the Amsterdam 
Treaty effective in May 1999. In fact, CFSP has several objectives in its policy. They in-
clude not only ‶to safeguard the common values and interests" and ‶to strengthen the se-
curity of the Union" but also ‶to preserve peace and strengthen international security in 
accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter."3 The High Representatives 
of CFSP also claimed that the EU made further progress to enhance EU CSDP (Common 
Security Defense Policy) support to UN peacekeeping. This included the preparation of a 
clear house model to create a policy agreement on the EU facilitating coordinated Member 
States' contribution to UN operations.4 However, despite EU's ambition and goal to con-
tribute to international or regional security, there are few major peacekeeping operations 
with thousands of troops led by the EU.
　　Meanwhile, NATO is the most functional and effective military alliance in the world 
that can hardly be challenged in the technological and logistics realm of military missions. 
William Durch argued that several regional organization are building up their capability to 
provide such security but there are just two international organizations that can recruit, 
manage, and sustain peacekeeping forces in the more volatile of post-war settings: the UN 
and NATO.5 However, Durch also pointed out that there are several substantial differences 
between the UN and NATO. First, the evolved purpose of the UN includes support for hu-
man rights, national sovereignty, and self-determination, while the evolved purpose of 
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NATO is to promote military stability and political development in and around Europe. 
Second, the targets of the UN are bad governance and political instability, disease, fear, 
oppression, organized crime and terrorism, while NATO's targets include global terrorist 
organizations, fundamentalist tyranny, and aggressive hyper-nationalism.6 Therefore, there 
should be the so-called ‶division of labour" in peace operations between the UN and 
NATO. UN peace operations are more suitable and preferable for multi-functional mis-
sions which focus on state-building. NATO peace operations are more suitable for coercive 
peace-making or stabilization missions, prior to comprehensive UN missions. In fact, as 
can be seen from Table 4, NATO conducted stabilization operations such as SFOR, KFOR 
and ISAF in Bosnia, and fire-fighting operations such as Operation Deliberate Force in 
Afghanistan. 
　　Therefore, one question can be raised, ‶To what extent have UN peacekeeping opera-
tions been affected by European states' enthusiasm in their regional peacekeeping?" The 
most significant non-UN peace operation affecting European countries in the post 9.11 pe-
riod was the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF was cre-
ated in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001, in order to create a se-
cure environment in and around Kabul by eliminating the Taliban regime and international 
terrorists and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan. ISAF was authorized by UNSC 
1386 on 20 December 2001, and was initially commanded by a ‶Coalition of the Willing", 
and on 11 August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operations. In October 
2003, the UN, through UNSC 1510, extended ISAF's mandate to cover the whole of Af-
ghanistan.
　　Table 5 refers to the commitment of the 22 positively contributing European states to 
UN peacekeeping in 1996 listed in Table 3, to UN peacekeeping and ISAF in January 
2007 and October 2011. The total strength of ISAF in January 2007 was still modest, 
35,460. Afterwards, the strength was significantly expanded to more than 130,000 
(137,638) in October 2011. As shown in Table 5, in January 2007, one can see 16 out of 22 
states decreasing the number of dispatched troop personnel to UN peacekeeping compared 
with the number in 1996. Furthermore, 15 out of the 16 states (excluding Ukraine), dis-
patched their troop personnel to ISAF. Presumably, among the 15 states, the decision of 
their commitment to ISAF by 13 European states (excluding Ireland and Slovak Rep.) re-
sulted in decrease of the number of troops dispatched to UN peacekeeping operations. Es-
pecially, several East European states, which used to be the enemies of NATO, such as Ro-
mania, Bulgaria and Czech Rep. expressed a significant shift of their security policy to the 
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NATO framework. They sent no troops to UN peacekeeping in January 2007, and they in-
stead sent almost the same size of troops (or more) which they had sent to UN peacekeep-
ing in 1996, to NATO-commanded ISAF in January 2007. 
Table 5:  The Number of the Dispatch of Troop Personnel of Main European States’ Contribution to UN 
Peacekeeping Operations and ISAF, 1996-2011 
1996 Jan. 2007 Oct. 2011
Contributing
States UN PKO UN PKO UN missions deployed ISAF UN PKO UN missions deployed ISAF
Poland 1,097 653↓ UNDOF344, UNIFIL319 160 0↓ 2,580
Finland 924 218↓
UNIFIL 213, UNMIL 3
UNMIS 2
70 2↓ UNIFIL 2 195
Austria 867 377↓ UNDOF 373, UNFYCIP 4 500 383→
UNDOF 377, UNFYCIP 4
UNIFIL 2
3
Belgium 836 361↓ UNIFIL 361 300 120↓
UNIFIL 98, MONUSCO 
22
577
Romania 787 0↓ 750 0→ 1,947
Ireland 745 492↓ UNMIL 331, UNIFIL 161 10 453→ UNIFIL 453 7
Norway 732 139↓ UNIFIL 130, UNMIS 9 350 4↓ UNMISS 4 582
Slovak Rep. 588 292↓ UNFYCIP 196, UNDOF 96 50 159↓ UNFYCIP 159 326
France 502 1868↑
UNIFIL 1,680, UNOCI 185
MINUSTAH 2, UNMIL 1
1,000 1312↓
UNIFIL 1303, UNOCI 6
MINUSTAH 2, UNMIL 1
3,932
Ukraine 438 300↓ UNMIL 300 0 277→ UNMIL 277 23
Portugal 406 146↓ UNIFIL 146 150 150→ UNIFIL 150 229
UK 405 276↓
UNFYCIP 270, UNMIL 3
UNMIS 3
5,200 275→
UNFYCIP 271, UNISFA 2
UNMISS 2
9,500
Germany 173 930↑
UNIFIL 913, UNMIL 12
UNMIS 5
3,000 241↓
UNIFIL 234, UNMISS 4,
UNAMID 3
5,150
Sweden 168 70↓ UNIFIL 68, UNMIS 2 180 2↓ UNMISS 2 614
Denmark 125 55↓
UNIFIL 48, UNMIS 6
MINURSO 1
400 149↑ UNIFIL 147, UNMIL 2 750
Hungary 102 88↓ UNFYCIP 84, UNIFIL 4 180 81→ UNFYCIP 77, UNIFIL 4 415
Netherlands 100 174↑ UNIFIL 171, UNMIS 3 2,200 1↓ UNAMID 1 183
Bulgaria 79 0↓ 100 0→ 597
Italy 71 2427↑ UNIFIL 2427 1,950 1811↓ UNIFIL 1810, UNMISS 1 4,213
Czech Rep. 49 0↓ 150 0→ 694
Spain 47 1108↑ UNIFIL 1108 550 1073→ UNIFIL 1073 1,526
Turkey 40 526↑ UNIFIL 522, UNMIS 4 800 361↓ UNIFIL 361 1,840
Source:  Military Balance 2012, International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Monthly Summary of Troop Contributions 
to Peacekeeping Operations, as of 31 December 1996, 31 January 2007, and 30 October 2011, Department of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, NY
　　Meanwhile, six states, France, Germany, the Netherland, Italy, Spain, and Turkey, in-
creased the number of UN peacekeeping dispatch in January 2007, in comparison with 
1996. All of them are the large powers in Europe and the core members of NATO, and, 
therefore, all of them sent a significant size of troops to ISAF in 2007. Furthermore, it is to 
be noted that the main or only reason for the significant increase of their UN peacekeeping 
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dispatch in 2007 is participation in UNIFIL in South Lebanon. The strength of UNFIL was 
significantly expanded by UNSC 1701 in August 2006 when conﬂict between Israel and 
Hizbollah erupted and a heavy exchange of fire worsened the situation in South Lebanon. 
Therefore, the commitment of European great powers such as France and Germany to 
UNIFIL in 2006 and its aftermath was attributed to their geo-political interests in South 
Lebanon located in the Middle East. For example, Kai Michael Kenkel, the German expert 
on security, clearly said that Germany is more likely to contribute to UN peacekeeping in 
significant numbers where it is likely to be joined by its European allies and where there is 
an overlap with alliance interests. In fact, the preoccupation of the European states with 
UNFIL was remarkable in January 2007.7 UNIFIL accounted for 78.5% of the total troops 
dispatched by 22 European states to UN peacekeeping operations.
　　The tendency of the departure of the European states from UN peacekeeping became 
more significant in October 2011, when only one state out of 22, Denmark, increased its 
troop personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, compared with January 2007. Ten states 
almost maintained their total troop strength to UN peacekeeping in 2011, and 11 states fur-
ther decreased their total troop strength compared with 2007. The total troop strengths of 
22 European states were reduced from 10,510 in January 2007 to 6,854 in October 2011. 
Again, UNIFIL accounted for 86 percent of the total European participation in UN peace-
keeping. In terms of the figure of ISAF in 2011, indeed 20 out of 22 European states in-
creased troop strength dispatched to ISAF. In particular, the enthusiasm and commitment 
of Poland, Romania, Sweden, Bulgaria, Czech Rep. and Turkey to NATO-led ISAF was 
remarkable.
　　Table 5 also indicated that while European states dispatched massive troops to UNI-
FIL, they sent ‶token troops", where states send less than ten troops, to a number of UN 
missions. The token troops were identified in UNMIS (Sudan), UNMISS (South Sudan), 
UNMIL (Liberia), MINUSTAH (Haiti) and UNOCI (Cote d'Ivore) etc, most of which are 
African UN missions. In reality, many contributing states have sent a small number of 
staff officers who work at the mission headquarters. In fact, Katharina Coleman argued 
that token troop contributions represent a deliberate strategy to spread state's military re-
sources over more multilateral operations.8 Token contributors can get access to operation-
al and political information circulated within the mission and the right to attend UN meet-
ings on the mission. This benefit can be provided with small cost and capability by sending 
a small number of staff officers in UN missions. In other words, European states made a 
clever policy to UN peacekeeping operations; they sent a small number of staff officers as 
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a token contribution to strategically less significant African UN missions, sent relatively 
large troops to UN peacekeeping in the Middle East, such as UNIFIL, and sent more mas-
sive troop numbers to a more strategically important NATO mission, namely, ISAF. The 
policy of this division of labour was attributed to the reality that the capacity of states' 
commitment to sending troops overseas has been mostly fixed and not significantly 
changed in a short term. 
4.  The Peacekeeping Strategies of European States in the post-ISAF Period: Should They 
Go back to UN Peacekeeping? 
　　Departure of European states from UN peacekeeping became more noticeable after-
wards. In September 2012 European countries (including non EU states) were contributing 
less than 5 per cent or 4,670 troops out of 97,199 in UN peacekeeping operations.9   Mean-
while, ISAF terminated at the end of 2014. European states have had more of a tendency 
to join their peacekeeping missions within the framework of the EU than NATO and the 
UN.
Table 6: EU Peace Operations (military operations) 2015
Mission Country Period Troop Size
ARTEMIS RD Congo Jun. 2003-Sep. 2003 1,800
CONCORDIA FYROM Mar. 2003-Dec. 2003 350
EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia Herzegovina Dec. 2004-present 7,000
Support to AMIS II Sudan / Darfur Jul. 2005-Dec. 2006 15
EUFOR RD Congo RD Congo Jul. 2006-Nov. 2006 　NA
EUFOR Tchad / RCA Chad and CAR Jan. 2008-May 2009 3,000
EU NAVFOR Atalanta Dec. 2008-present 　NA
EUTM Somalia Somalia 2010-present 125
EUTM Mali Mali 2013-present 80
EUROR RCA CAR Feb. 2014-Mar. 2015 700
EUMAM RCA CAR 2015-present 60
Source:  European External Action Service 2015. 
http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm.
　　As can be seen from Table 6, the EU has created 11 military peace operations. Fur-
thermore, the EU has deployed 23 civilian missions.10 It must be disappointing for pro-UN 
figures who expected that EU states would go back to UN peacekeeping operations after 
the termination of ISAF. One can now pose a simple question, ‶Should the European 
states go back to UN peacekeeping operations?"
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4-1 Anti-UN peacekeeping perspectives for Europeans 
　　There are several reasons for a negative answer to the above question. Main reasons 
can be divided into three factors: they are the European states' policy of political realism, 
the principle of self-sufficiency, and European criticism of UN operations.
4-1-1 political realism
　　The first reason is based on the factor of political realism. Some claim that the coun-
tries that financially support UN peacekeepers, including many European states, are usual-
ly not the source for peacekeepers (Table 7). 11
Table 7:  Top 5 countries financially contributing to the UN and the numbers of their personnel topartici-
pating in UN peacekeeping operations (2014)
Country
Share of financial contribution
to the UN PKO (%) (2014)
Number of personnel to UN peacekeeping (rank) 
(Dec. 2014)
1st US 28.3 127 (66th)
2nd Japan 10.8 271 (52nd)
3rd France 7.2 922 (32nd)
4th Germany 7.1 179 (59th)
5th UK 6.6 289 (51st)
Source:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/jp-un/pko-yosan.htmil
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
　　One can also provide a geo-political reason due to the fact that non-UN operations 
spending has been concentrated in the Middle East and Central Asia and then East Asia 
and Pacific. Apparently, given oil interests in the Middle East and Central Asia, peace-
keepers' economic interests can be behind this pattern. UN peacekeeping has been mainly 
concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa, where missions bolster a global public good, namely, 
international stability. Most countries show little interest in sub-Saharan Africa. The UN 
has no alternative to be put in place where most countries have little specific economic or 
strategic concerns.12 Therefore, the UN may not become a major player in peacekeeping. 
In this sense, the presence of non-UN peacekeeping may discourage some contributing 
states to support UN peacekeeping. The UN Security Council, including the UK and 
France, may veto proposed UN missions for them to concentrate on non-UN peacekeep-
ing.13
　　Having casualties of national peacekeepers is not compatible with Europeans' national 
interests, either. For example, during the debate in the run-up to the 2003 EU operation in 
the DRC, there was a widespread debate in Germany about whether German soldiers 
could and should be put in a position for this reason. Additionally, for European troops, the 
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traumatic effects of combat in Afghanistan on returning soldiers have become a recurring 
element of public discourse. This public attitude has discouraged European governments 
from sending their troops especially to robust UN peacekeeping operations.14
4-1-2 self-sufﬁciency 
　　The second reason is based on the principle of ‶self-sufficiency". For example, the 
slogan of ‶African Solutions for African Problems" is the typical principle for this reason. 
This principle is compatible with other concepts and ideology including sustainable devel-
opment, capacity-building, and even de-colonialization. This principle became more sig-
nificant and noticeable especially in the post-cold war period when great and super powers 
had less motivation in domestic and regional matters in Asia and Africa. From another 
viewpoint, this principle has gained wide support from its advocates from the sectors of 
peace-building and state-building in the post-conﬂict situations after the civil wars in the 
1990s and 2000s. Presumably, this principle and concept would also be a preferable factor 
to the departure of European states from UN peacekeeping, especially, from Africa. One of 
the typical reﬂections of ‶African Solutions for African Problems" on military and conﬂict 
management is the advent of peacekeeping operations led by the African Union (AU). 
Since its establishment in 2002, the AU created eight peace operations, and their tasks var-
ied, ranging from election monitoring to peace enforcement. (Table 8)
Table 8: African Union Peace Operations, 2003-2012
Mission Location Duration Size Main Tasks
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) Burundi 2003-2004 3,250
Peacebuilding (DDR; humanitarian 
assistance) Enforcement
AU Military Observer Mission in the 
Comoros (MIOC)
Comoros 2004 41 Peace Observation
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Darfur 2004-2007 7,700 Peacekeeping/Civilian Protection
Special Task Force Burundi Burundi 2006-2009 750 VIP protection
AU Mission for Support to the 
Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)
Comoros 2006 1,260 Election Monitor
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Somalia 2007-present 17,731
Protection of government, counter-
insurgency
AU Electoral and Security Assistance 
Mission to the Comoros (MAES)
Comoros 2007-2008 350 Election support
Operation Democracy in Comoros Comoros 2008 1,350 Enforcement
Source:  Arthur Boutellis and Paul D. Williams ‶Peace Operations, the African Union, and the United Nations: Toward 
More Effective Partnerships", Working Paper, International Peace Institute, April 2013
　　The advantage of AU peacekeeping operations in Africa is that peacekeepers who are 
from neighboring countries are more familiar with each other's problems than outsiders. 
Neighbors usually have a fairly common culture, a common social identity, a common his-
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tory, and similar experiences.15 The AU can deploy troops from neighboring countries 
quicker and cheaper than the UN. There is a tendency that the latter deploys larger and 
more costly multidimensional operations than the former. Meanwhile, one can point out 
differences in peacekeeping doctrine between the AU and the UN. Instead of waiting for a 
peace to keep, they claimed that the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish 
peace before keeping it. In a similar context, AU troops can conduct peace enforcement 
tasks in contexts where the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement or political 
settlement may prevent the UN from deploying a peacekeeping operation, and/or where 
UN troop-contributing countries would be more reluctant to send troops. Furthermore, 
they argued that the AU and African troops can sometimes add political legitimacy and le-
verage to a peace operation, especially in contexts where the host government and/or sub-
region may not welcome a UN presence.16 In short, European simply can leave the African 
conﬂicts for Africans instead of putting their troops in UN or EU peacekeeping.
4-1-3 criticism of UN peacekeeping
　　The third reason is the criticism of UN peacekeeping and the preference of its own re-
gional peacekeeping mechanism. It is generally agreed that the EU is more capable of rap-
id force generation than the UN. In the case of UN peacekeeping operations, it sometimes 
takes months to recruit the sufficient size of peacekeeping forces after the adoptions of UN 
Security Council resolutions. European peacekeepers also consider that they have the ca-
pabilities to deploy troops to difficult areas of operation more professionally than UN 
counterparts.17  Many European peacekeepers prefer their own countries' commanders who 
are believed to have better skills in command and control than UN peacekeeping com-
manders. For example, an Italian scholar stated that such integrated command and control 
mechanisms are more familiar to Italy through its participation in EU missions instead of 
the UN.18 Likewise, a French expert on peacekeeping argued that while France's White Pa-
per on Defence and National Security put the UN at the center of its international security 
architecture, the UN is still perceived as structurally ill-adapted to France's conception of 
military crisis management.19 Meanwhile, Paul Williams, a British scholar specializing in 
peacekeeping and international security management, argued that many British political 
and military elites believe that the country's significant military power should not be con-
sidered an ordinary UN contributor. They consider that British troops would be wasted as 
rank and file infantry in UN operations because other states can provide such forces more 
effectively and cheaply.20
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4-2 Pro-UN peacekeeping perspectives for Europeans
　　In spite of the above negative factors, the necessity of the European states to deploy 
their troops in UN peacekeeping operations should be highly encouraged for the following 
three reasons: 1) the factor of (ir)relevance; 2) the factor of legitimacy; and 3) the factor of 
(European) value in UN peacekeeping.
4-2-1 (ir)relevance 
　　The first argument is that regional peacekeeping cannot be a substitute for UN peace-
keeping. Malte Brosig argues that most of the EU operations in Africa have been small in 
scale, focused on a limited number of policy goals, short term oriented and have operated 
in a limited geographical space.21 Calculating from Table 9, which refers to EU and UN 
operations in 2013, there is a huge gap between UN and EU peace operations in the num-
bers of military personnel per mission. (3,207 military personnel in UN peace operations 
and 170 personnel in EU) As can also be seen from Table 6, there are only three EU peace 
operations whose troop size exceeds 1,000; ARTEMIS, EUFOR ALTHEA, and EUFOR 
Tchad/RCA.
Table 9: EU and UN Peace Operations 2013
United Nations European Union
Number of Missions 28 17
Deployed Personnel 112,291 5,014
Military 89,799 2,891
Police 14,165 932
Civilian 8,327 1,191
Source:  Tobias Pietz ‶The European Union and UN Peacekeeping: Half-time for 
the EU's Action Plan" Policy Brieﬁng, the Center for International Peace 
Operations (ZIF), Berlin, October 2013)
　　Brosig also points out that a number of EU missions have been deployed in conjunc-
tion with the UN. In such cases EU peacekeeping either plays a role of a bridging mission 
preparing the ground for the UN (e.g. in Chad and Central African Republic) or it filled in 
functional gaps, as for example in the DRC (where it provided specialized support for 
elections or police reform). In short, it is evident that EU peacekeeping is essentially pro-
viding packaged support for existing missions run by the UN. In other words, in reality, 
EU peacekeeping cannot be a substitute for UN peacekeeping. Therefore, unless the Euro-
pean states remain reluctant to send troops to UN peacekeeping, the UN operations would 
simply be ‶the operations without European troops", and the troops from no other states 
can play a role and function replacing European troops. In sum, it is considered irrelevant 
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to compare between UN and EU peacekeeping operations on the same level.
4-2-2 legitimacy
　　The second argument is based on the factor of legitimacy. First, legitimacy in UN 
peacekeeping lies in its effectiveness of mechanism. While a number of scholars, experts 
and practitioners on UN peacekeeping have pointed out several concerns and even defects 
in UN peacekeeping mechanism, there has still been a number of positive supporters who 
asserted that UN peacekeeping operations ‶work well". In fact, there have been a wide 
range of criticisms of UN peacekeeping in accordance with various research and the les-
son-learned literature on UN peacekeeping. However, there have been very few experts 
who deny or negate UN peacekeeping itself. On the contrary, there are several significant 
researches which proved the positive effect of UN peacekeeping operations. For example, 
Alan James, a pioneer of UN peacekeeping research, conducted research almost all of the 
major conﬂicts in the world in the 20th century in Peacekeeping in International Politics 
(London: Macmillan, 1990), and reached the conclusion that ‶There can be little question 
that this device [international peacekeeping operations] has been of considerable assis-
tance of international peace."22 Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, conducted research 
of UN peace missions with extensive data, by referring to the extent of three conditions of 
peacekeeping success, declined hostility, local capacities and international assistance. 
They concluded in their book Making War and Building Peace (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2008) that ‶UN missions that are properly matched to the 
ecology of conﬂict [and especially multidimensional peacekeeping operations] help foster 
positive peace and prevent the recurrence of war by building the local institution."23 Vir-
ginia Page Forta, who also conducted extensive research of the effectiveness of interna-
tional peacekeeping with data of case studies in her book Does Peacekeeping Work? 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008) , argues ‶having a peacekeeping 
mission present reduces the estimated risk of another war by about 70%-75%, while hav-
ing had one in the past that has done its job and gone home cuts the hazard of another war 
by 87%-100%". Forta concluded ‶in short, peacekeepers make an enormous difference to 
the prospects for peace, not only while they are present, nut even after they depart. They 
are extremely effective at helping belligerents to set up self-sustaining peace".24
　　Meanwhile, there has not been extensive research analyzing the effectiveness of re-
gional or non-UN peacekeeping operations with a longer perspective. UN peacekeeping 
operations still have legitimacy in their effective mechanism to which European states 
should be committed for a longer period. On the contrary, the deployment of non-UN 
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peacekeeping forces would be disadvantageous for European great powers. The history of 
European colonization in Africa makes it more preferable for African states to accept Eu-
ropean troops in the framework of UN peacekeeping as a legitimacy measure. 
　　Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin also points out several positive roles 
of peacekeeping operations by international organizations such as the UN, compared with 
regional peacekeeping or coalitions of the willing. For example, international organiza-
tions help to set the rules for peacekeepers themselves. Contributing states must work 
within the organization's agreed rules and to the mandate it provides. International organi-
zations provide greater accountability and transparency than coalitions of the willing orga-
nized by pivotal states and often possess internal procedures for auditing operations.25
　　Another factor of legitimacy for UN peacekeeping operations is related to the value of 
multilateralism in the UN. Christine Gray argues that the reluctance of European states to 
participate in UN peacekeeping in Africa, and their apparent preference that regional orga-
nizations should play the main role, leads on to questions about the duties of member 
states and the nature of multilateralism. Gray continues:
　　…[M]ember states on the UN have a duty to operate multilaterally. … Is there not an 
even stronger duty to contribute to UN operations when called on especially where they 
are designed to prevent genocide or other humanitarian disaster? .. Is there not a duty not 
only to act unilaterally but also to enable the UN to act effectively?. … In practical terms 
the rhetoric of ‶partnership" and ‶ownership", however attractive, is no substitute for 
multilateralism.26
　　The legitimacy issue in UN peacekeeping operations can be recognized in the UN Se-
curity Council. Needless to say, the Security Council should value the nature of UN peace-
keeping operations, and is therefore required to make efforts to develop UN operations. 
Meanwhile, in reality, two out of five states of the Security Council from Europe, namely 
the UK and France, has been, however, reluctant to send their troops to UN peacekeeping. 
If the UK and France intend to maintain their policy of keeping distance from UN peace-
keeping, they should positively reconsider opening the door of the UN Security Council 
reform so that ‶more pro-UN peacekeeping states" could join the Security Council as per-
manent members.
　　Legality is also seen as determining the legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations. It 
is well-known that Chapter VIII of the UN Charter has been occasionally misled or mar-
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ginalized by developed countries including some Europeans, for example, in the case of 
the NATO airstrikes in Serbia in 1995 and the Iraq War in 2003. One is wondering if the 
reliance by developed states on an increased role for regional and sub-regional organiza-
tions in peacekeeping and peace enforcement has led to a change in the interpretation of 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter on regional action. In other words, the question has ara-
ised whether developed states including European states might intend to rewrite the Char-
ter, specifically to accept a more ﬂexible interpretation of Article 53 on regional action to 
allow regional organization greater autonomy and wider power to use force.27
4-2-3 (Europeans’) value
　　Thirdly, European states have the significant values for their participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. It has been well known that many UN peacekeeping operations 
in the post-cold war are multi-functional, with the sectors of election-monitoring, human 
right protections, SSR, rule of law and justice etc. These sectors in UN peacekeeping have 
been based on the democratization process, modelled on the modern Western political sys-
tem. Therefore, it should be recommended that European contingents participate in the 
current multi-functional UN peacekeeping countries in the developing countries in Asia 
and Africa.
　　European troops and their peacekeepers should also be valued in terms of morality 
and capability in operational areas in UN peacekeeping. For example, it has been well-
known that some UN peacekeepers, especially from Africa, have been criticized for their 
non-humanitarian conduct such as the violation of human rights and sexual harassment. 
Other peacekeepers from developing countries have made use of the opportunities in their 
UN missions as a business chance.28
　　The report of the International Peace Institute (IPI) also clearly stated that even in 
many of its largest and most challenging missions, particularly in sub-Sahara Africa where 
there are few European UN peacekeepers, UN peacekeeping still lacks an array of critical 
enablers, which significantly limits its operational capabilities and negatively affects the 
implementation of mission mandates.29  European troops would definitely contribute to im-
proving morale and capability in UN peacekeeping in Africa.
　　In fact, according to the UN's Office of Military Affairs, many of the gaps in UN 
peacekeeping capabilities are in the areas of interoperability, intelligence-driven operations 
and more air assets.30 It is recommended that European contributors should be in a position 
to provide air assets. According to research by New York University's Center on Interna-
tional Cooperation (CIC), current UN force generation resources and mechanisms have 
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been unable to effectively meet requirements for military helicopters in UN peacekeeping 
operations. In fact, the UN anticipated a shortage of 56 out of 137 authorized helicopters 
in April 2011. This shortage has negatively impacted a peacekeeping force's operational 
mobility, deterrent credibility, and logistical functions, as well as other critical mission ca-
pabilities such as medical and casualty evacuation.31  Therefore, the UN has sought to 
strengthen the military component of its peacekeeping operations with ‶force enablers" in-
cluding helicopters. Table 10 shows helicopter contributing states to UN peacekeeping op-
erations. Of the 13 states providing helicopters to UN peacekeeping operations, nine 
states32 were also among the top twenty troop countries. Utility helicopters are in general 
used in the presence of national contingents on the ground to offer additional protection to 
these forces. Meanwhile, attack helicopters are used for enforcement actions by peace-
keepers. In fact, the significant role of the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in the UN 
Stabilisation Mission in DRC (MONUSCO) defeating the local rebel group, the M23, was 
in part due to the offensive equipment including attack helicopters.33 However, Table 10 
shows that Italy and Spain were the only European providers of helicopters. Since Europe-
an states possess more sophisticated military equipment including utility and attack heli-
copters than developing countries, they are recommended to participate in UN peacekeep-
ing operations where they contribute to the issue of the shortage of helicopters.
Table 10:  Helicopter Contributing States to UN Peacekeeping Operations 
(February 2011)
State Utility Helicopter
Attack 
Helicopter Total
Commercial 111 0 111
India 10 4 14
Ukraine 8 3 11
Bangladesh 9 0 9
Russia 8 0 8
Pakistan 6 0 6
Argentina 5 0 5
Ethiopia 0 5 5
Chile 4 0 4
Italy 4 0 4
Ghana 3 0 3
South Africa 2 0 2
Spain 2 0 2
Uruguay 2 0 2
Total 174 12 186
Source:  Department of Field Support, the United Nations. Quoted from Center on In-
ternational Cooperation (CIC), ‶Assessment of Helicopter Force Generation 
Challenges for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations", p. 3
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5. Conclusion
　　This paper initially dealt with the ‶glorious" history of European participation in UN 
peacekeeping operations. This tendency continued even for several years after the termina-
tion of the cold war. However, afterwards European commitment to UN peacekeeping op-
erations gradually faded out, when Europeans started experiencing European peace opera-
tions organized by the EU, NATO or their own country. EU-led peace operations were 
small, focused on limited terms and policy goals, and Europeans realized that thier own 
operations were efficient and effective compared with UN operations. Above all, their pol-
icy change of the departure from UN peacekeeping was significantly inﬂuenced by their 
strong commitment to ISAF in Afghanistan. ISAF's total military strength of nearly 
100,000 was almost the same as the total size of all of the UN peacekeeping operations, 
and most of the European ‶elite" of UN peacekeepers had to dispatch massive troops to 
ISAF. ISAF terminated in December 2014. 
　　Unfortunately, many European states did not return to UN peacekeeping, even though 
several Europeans powers such the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Poland and even Roma-
nia, who sent thousands of troops to ISAF, indicated their quantitative capabilities to peace 
operations. Their diminished enthusiasm might have been partly due to so-called ‶Afghan 
fatigue" and the following financial constraints in their defense budgets.34 Meanwhile, this 
paper attributed the lack of their motivation to continue participating in UN peacekeeping 
to the states' strong policy of political realism, their subsequent reliance on AU peacekeep-
ing operations in Africa, and the criticism of the UN operations themselves in terms of 
lack of rapid deployment capability and other professionalism. While the above arguments 
are reasonable and understandable, they are rather self-centered with narrow viewpoints. 
　　Nevertheless, this paper also emphasized several significant arguments which recom-
mended and necessitated a European return to UN peacekeeping operations. First, many 
EU peace operations, which are very limited and specific in their size and goals, are very 
different from UN operations. Therefore, European states should be encouraged to partici-
pate in UN peacekeeping when their professionalism is demanded. Second, European par-
ticipation in UN peacekeeping should be recommended by the factor of legitimacy. Some 
extensive research proved UN operations' high record of operational effectiveness. Anoth-
er legitimacy issue concerns the preference of European involvement in peace operation 
within the framework of the UN because of their colonial history in their operational areas 
and the high degree of accountability and transparency in UN operations. Above all, the 
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legitimacy of European commitment to UN peacekeeping is due to the multilateralism of 
the UN, strongly requits in its Charter. Third, related to the first, Europeans are demanded 
to participate in UN peacekeeping operations because of the values which Europeans have 
in conducting UN peacekeeping operations. Europeans can instruct the Western-led hu-
manitarian and democratization process, where some other contributing states are not de-
veloped, in current multi-functional UN peacekeeping operations. Europeans should pro-
vide their advanced technology demanded in current UN peacekeeping such as utility and 
attack helicopters. This paper recognizes the significance of these arguments and therefore 
supports Europeans' further commitment to UN peacekeeping operations as well as re-
gional ones. European states are expected to play a more significant role as model UN 
peacekeepers again as the pioneers of UN peacekeeping operations.
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